Introduction

Although national legislation and international conventions guarantee the protection of freedom of religion, freedom of expression, citizen security and property rights, and freedom of choice, Sampang Shiites have not been able to return to their hometowns until now. It has been about six years since the displacement of the vulnerable group but their right as internally displaced persons (IDPs) to return to their homes in Sampang, East Java remains unfulfilled. After the sectarian attack on the Shiite community in Sampang, Indonesia, various reconciliation efforts have not succeeded in returning the Shiites to their homes until this present. Around 81 families or 335 people still displace from their homes in Sampang, and live in Puspa Agro flat, a refugee-like camp, in Sidoarjo, East Java, since they had been forced for relocation (Muluk, 2017).

Article

Internally Displace Persons and Informal Citizenship: Sampang Shiites' Struggle after Sectarian Violence

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Abstract

After a sectarian attack on the Shia community in Sampang, Indonesia, they live in refugee camps. Even though the refugees have now returned, the reconciliation efforts took quite a long time. The Shia community had to live in refugee camps for about ten years. This paper argues that the clientelistic structure is the main obstacle to repatriation. Amid social and economic marginalization and the limited role of the government in fulfilling their basic rights in the refugee camps, the Shia of Sampang can still hold on to fulfill their citizenship and hope to return home through informal networks and mechanisms. This article shows that although with the help of various parties, the Sampang Shia community can gradually gain legal status, political participation, and (limited) economic rights as citizens, it is still difficult for them to regain their membership in Sampang socially and culturally.

Keywords

Informal Citizenship, Internally Displace Persons, Sampang Shiites, Sectarian Conflict
There are various studies about Sampang Shiites which explore violence, exclusion, conflict resolution, and the abolition of human rights principles. Yet, their struggle and achievement of citizenship with certain contentious social-political contexts remains understudied. The paper argues that the clientelistic structure is the primary point of the Shiite's eviction and the big obstacle for repatriating them. However, amidst social and economic marginalization and the limited role of the government in fulfilling their basic rights in a refugee-like camp, the Sampang Shiites can still survive to meet their citizenship and keep hopes of returning home through informal networks and mechanisms. They can still fulfill their basic rights such as in education, economics, and health, as well as political participation in general elections. In the same concern, Jessica Soedirgo studied Ahmadiyah communities’ clientelism network and informal institutions helping the vulnerable group to gain the benefits and protections of citizenship in West Java (Soedirgo, 2018). In addition, despite the power relations between the government, politicians, and religious leaders being continuously maintained to corner Sampang Shiites and inhibit or deny the return of refugees, the hegemony is not totally and essential. Hegemony suffered a rift with the rise of Sampang Shiites supporters, both from the government and civil society with Sunni identity. This reinforces the sense of identity and hope of Sampang Shiites to survive and continue determined to return to their hometown. I will show that while with the help of various parties Sampang Shiites gradually can gain legal status, political participation, and (limited) economic right as citizens, as internal refugees and religious minorities, they are still difficult to reenter membership in Sampang socially and culturally. Consequently, they still cannot come back to their homeland and get social and properties rehabilitation.

Sectarian Conflict and Clientilism

The policy of forced relocation into a series of marginalization suffered by Sampang Shiites, as well as the beginning of eviction of them from their homeland to refugee-like camp in Puspa Agro flat, Sidoarjo, since 20 June 2013. Previously, there was a communal sectarian attack against Sampang Shiites in Karang Gayam hamlet, Omen district and Blu’uren village, Karangpenang district, Sampang regency, on August 26, 2012 (Sampang case II). The perpetrators continued to attack with stone throws, Molotov cocktails, and sharp weapons. As a result of the attack, one person named Hamama (50 years old) was stabbed by a machete, 10 people suffered critical injuries, and dozens of people suffered injuries. The mob also violently burned and damaged 48 Sampang Shiite's houses until late in the evening. Previously, on December 29, 2011 (Sampang case I), the house of Tajul Muluk, Iklil Al-Milal, and Hanik (prominent figures of Sampang Shiites) were burned by the masses. Residents of Sampang Shiites consisting of 107 children and toddlers and 228 adults and elderly (335 people) were finally evacuated at Sampang Sports Hall (GOR) (Semendawai et al., 2013).

Generally, there are two dominant views responding to this violence and conflict. First is the legal and human rights-based standpoint that sees this as the violation of religious freedom and criminal acts that were supported by the conservative narrative and mobilization from religious leaders and the omission from the local government. This perspective highly demands to the state actors to take responsibility for these cases by punishing the perpetrators, reconciling both conflicting parties, fulfilling the rights of Sampang Shiites as internally displaced persons, and rehabilitating and repatriating them (Semendawai et al., 2013). While this perspective is important to press the government, it fails to understand why Sampang Shiites live in harmony for years before 2012 and why Shiites in
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Bangkalan (city next to Sampang) and other cities were not violated and attacked. The second is a conservative view which assumes Sampang Shiites are often regarded as the heretics and the anger to Indonesian Islamic identity (especially Madurese Traditional Islamic identity) (MUI, 2012). This perspective is emphasized by the intolerant religious leader [kiyai], political entrepreneurs, and anti-Shiite organizations. They insist that relocating out of Madura or repentance by converting Shiite to Sunni is the only option.

The third is a cultural relativistic view that believes there is a conflict of norms between the universalism of religious freedom and cultural relativism in the case of Sampang. In this perspective, the minority will not find a problem as long as it is able to maintain the local values, including the philosophy of Madurese life: babbhu'-guruh-ratho as the necessity of submission and excessive obedience to Kiyai. Kiyai is placed as an "informal leader" beyond government. The method of Shiite preaching is considered to disturb Kiyai's charisma and disrupt the Sunni majority.

The emphasis on legal, religious, or cultural aspects of the sectarian violence, misrecognition, and eviction of Sampang Shiites is problematic. Besides reducing the complexity of conflict factors as mentioned in another writing (Afdillah, 2016), these emphases are apolitical to highly clientelistic in paternalistic political structures like in Sampang. Clientelism means "a more or less personalized, affective, and reciprocal relationship between actors, or sets of actors, commanding unequal resources and involving mutually beneficial transactions that have political ramifications beyond the immediate sphere of dyadic relationships." In the context of Sampang, there is the intimately reciprocal relationship between Kiyais, civilians [bejingan], Sampang government, and politicians causing the continual exclusion of Shiite Sampang from the membership of the Sampang community. It pretty much has similarity in the case of a persecuted minority like Ahmadiyah in Tasikmalaya, East Java, where clients play in the persecution depending on three sets of actors: patrons (elites protecting the subordinate client in exchange for general support), brokers (the local intermediaries between patrons and clients), and clients, as demonstrated by Soedirgo (Soedirgo, 2018).

According to Iklil Al-Milal and Tajul Muluk, Sampang Shiites figures, the nexus of 'three small local imperial institutions'-bureaucrats, religious leaders, and civilians-made the spreading rumors about Shiite as the heresy and escalate the conflict to sectarian violence. Frequently, civilians assisted certain religious leaders in collecting money to get spiritual legitimation, Politicians very considered Kyai as the huge social capital for election, and hence Kyai had so powerful bargain (Al-Milal, 2015). Among the local government bureaucracy, Sampang Shiites were considered too involved and bothering the bureaucracy in civic administration. Shias Sampang often demanded that citizens have a marriage certificate. It was because the community easily performed marriage-divorce without a marriage certificate. In addition, there were also birth certificate problems that were rarely owned by residents, while it is important to take care of the educational waivers for their children. In the hamlet of Nangkernang, thugs or thieves were not very masterful. Residents of Sampang Shiites initiated the guarding posts in the village and theft could be minimized. Sampang Shiites also often protested the requirement of four to five million ransom money to return the stolen goods which were actually known by the village head [klebun]. In Kyais' view, Sampang Shiites were considered to change tradition. Kiyais were invited several times in the commemoration of the birth of Prophet Muhammad [maulid nabi] which was held in every house expensively, especially funding the preaching of Kyai at their homes. Iklil and Tajul regretted the number of people
who held a mauled by mortgaging rice fields or borrowing money to loan sharks. Tajul led the diversion of maulid nabi from the habit of conducting every house to the joint holding in a mosque. Besides the loss of cultural space and economic resources, many local Kyai did not like Tajul as a new religious figure because their charisma was rivaled and distorted. In addition, there is a new nickname for them, namely "Kyai Slabet" (Slabet means envelope to associate with greedy attitude) (Afdillah, 2016).

Before 2006, the direct tension between Sampang Shiites and the anti-Shiites groups did not happen and the local government did not involve in canceling Shiites' activities. Despite since 2004 Tajul Muluk's oppositions began to confront him in the limited meeting and accuse him of being heretical along with the fear of the opposition with the increased numbers of his follower, the open confrontation did not happen because of the charisma of Kyai Ma'mun, the father of Tajul Muluk, as a well-known honored figure. Kyai Ma'mun became a balancing force to neutralize the confrontation led by Kyai Karrar, the uncle of Tajul Muluk having disrespectful to Shiites when many of Tajul's oppositions were his loyal students ago. Tajul's shelter was lost when Kyai Ma'mun who was very old passed away in 2006. The riot almost happened when Tajul would hold Maulid with memorial tradition, after 40 days of the demise of the late Kyai Ma'mun, because there was a rumor that Tajul would invite 12 Shiite Ulema from Kuwait. Police secured the polarization but the Maulid was canceled. After Kyai Ma'mun passed away, Kyai Karrar more got vast support to reject Tajul Muluk and his Shiite in Sampang. Unfortunately, Rois Al-Hukama, the brother of Tajul Muluk defending Shiite many years ago, declares that he was not a Shiite member again. Internal conflict with Tajul Muluk in the dramatic, romantic love case was one of the causes, besides the competition of Kyai Ma'mun's inheritance with many land properties (Afdillah, 2016).

After Kyai Ma'mun passed away, Kyai Karrar more got vast support to reject Tajul Muluk and his Shiite in Sampang. Bringing the Shiite issue to the Association of Madurese Ulema Bonding (BASSRA), Kyai Karrar initiated some meetings asking about his Shiite assumed as the heresy, forcing him to return to Sunni, and suggesting the (regional) Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia/MUI) in Sampang to released fatwa about the heretical issue (Panggabean & Fauzi, 2015). Kyai Karrar, despite he is Tajul's uncle, was the most active, influential Kyai propagating the conversion or the eviction of Shiites.

Because Kiyais are socially, culturally, and politically strong as "informal leaders" having religious authority beyond governmental authority in Sampang society, the local government including regent and vice-regent actively privilege and even support Kiyais' demand to convert or evict Sampang Shiites. The role of Kiyai as the primary intermediary person in gaining political support for certain politicians is well known in Sampang or Madurese Society. With the strong and dense alliance of regional Kiyai like Association of Madurese Ulema Bonding (BASSRA), the Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia/MUI) Sampang, and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) Sampang that have a very big influence in the social and political arena, the local government cannot defend state neutrality. On 5 April 2011, regional leaders of Sampang governmental institutions initiated a mediation. Regent and Vice Regent of Sampang also participated with the head of the regional police office of East Java. The main figures, Tajul Muluk, and many Kiyais from NU and MUI participated as well. Rather than mediating, that meeting provided the arena of judgment for Shiites by religious figures justified by the government and apparatus (Semendawai et al., 2013).
Regarding the anti-Shiite narrative, on 23 July 2012, about one month after the first sectarian violence, the regional level of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) in East Java released a fatwa (the product of Islamic law made by the Islamic authority outside the court) about the heresy of Shiite doctrine. Before that, MUI in Sampang with all of MUI in East Java, except MUI in Bondowoso, released a fatwa about Shiite and its anger as the heresy (Afdillah, 2016). Surprisingly, the Governor of East Java, on 23 July 2012, released government regulation delegating MUI to measure the criteria of heresy, and, as such, supported fatwa MUI about Shiite in Sampang. Moreover, that fatwa was a source of National Court in Sampang to legitimate judgment on 11 Juli 2012 that Tajul Muluk, as the leader of Shiite in Sampang, was proven for contravening Blasphemy law. Despite Tajul Muluk being in jail, about one month after the judgment, on 26 August 2012, the second sectarian violence against Shiites in Sampang exploded.

Because of the powerful tie between brokers and patrons; Kiyais alliance and local and regional government, 20 June 2013, finally the force can evict Sampang Shiites by relocating them to Sidoarjo. With the alliance of religious leaders within BASSRA, Kyai Karrar, led the forceful relocation of Shiites on 23 June 2013 when the relocation led by Vice Regent of Sampang was so hard to be executed. Moreover, before the relocation, MUI in Sampang collected thousands of signatures of Madurese society for the petition to reject Shiites and support the eviction. Various intimidations and terrors emerged, such as BASSRA’s ultimatum to end Shiite proselytization and teaching by various non-state and state institutions in Sampang, like from MUI, BASSRA, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) Sampang, Ministry of Religious Affairs Sampang, and Institute of Coordination for Monitoring the School of Belief (BAKORPAKEM) (Panggabean & Fauzi, 2015) with 32 accusations of heretical aspects of Shiite (26 October 2009), the vigilante mob intimidation making Tajul secured by Police (27 Juli 2010), and the order for Tajul to make a statement that he would not practice Shiite teaching again for the public safety (26 October 2010) (Semendawai et al., 2013).

Finally, based on the instruction of the Minister of Political, Legal and Security Affairs and the Governor of East Java with the coordination of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, about 168 Sampang Shiites were relocated by the Sampang Government to the Puspa Agro Sidoarjo apartment using three trucks and two police buses and escorted by three patrol cars. Previously, Sampang Shiite people rejected the relocation and did not want to be moved from the Sampang Sports Hall as the temporary refugee camp. Tajul was currently imprisoned in a case of religious blasphemy reported by his assailants. Ikil during the forced relocation was lying sick and had fainted. He was forced to move on a stretcher and planned to be taken to the hospital, but apparently, he was transferred to the Puspa Agro flat, Sidoarjo.

The Religious Minister in that period, Surya Dharma Ali, obtained the presidential mandate, followed the dominative clientelistic allegiance and localized the Sampang conflict by giving reconciliation control to the Madurese Kiyais. He pressed the displaced Shiites to go to Hajj Dormitory, Pondok Gede, East Jakarta to 'equate perceptions' with Kiyais and 'be trained' with the knowledge of living in harmony before their homes would be re-built. According to Surya Dharma Ali, Kiyais better understand the culture, the characteristics of the Sampang community, and should be given more room for 'solving' the problem at the local level. Nevertheless, he seems to only replace the word "repentance" (pertaubatan) required by Kiyai with more subtle words such as "enlightenment" and "perceptual
equations”. He does not regard the Sampang conflict as a Sunni and Shiites conflict that exists in Islam, but as a matter of “blasphemy” (Dhyatmika, 2013).

Each level of government often says that they have no capacity to solve the case, yet actually they are reluctant to move against anti-Shiites Kiyais as the brokers. The new Minister of Religious Affairs Lukman Hakim Saifuddin instead entirely hand over the Sampang case to the regional government with just coordinating without political willingness for bridging direct reconciliation equally. While at the regional level, the provincial government of East Java and the district government of Sampang expressed their inability to handle the current rejection of Shiite refugees by conservative, intolerant groups. Besides, the regional government is only able to fulfill ‘secular’ needs for Shiite refugees, such as shelter, administration, and subsidy, despite in practice there are still many shortcomings. This barrier coercing faith conversion becomes one of the biggest obstacles to reconciliation. The government seems reluctant to handle the power of intolerant groups that negate the identity of Shiite refugees (Faizal, 2017).

**Informal Citizenship and the Struggle for Justice**

Thinking beyond formal state institutions and mechanisms is crucial to gain citizenship limited and restricted. According to Berenschot and Kinklen Informal network is very important to deal with state institutions and it should be seen as a constitutive dimension of citizenship, rather than the deviation of citizenship, to deal with the unresponsive and unpredictable nature of Indonesia’s state institutions. The cultivation of personal connections constitutes an important form of political agency (Berenschot & van Klinken, 2018). The informal institution and mechanism is imperative to gain social-economic justice in the contious area, especially when the state formal institutions engage in cultural injustice with misrecognition and disrespect and economic injustice with maldistribution and economic inequality and marginalization (Stokke, 2017).

Actually, in grassroots levels of Sampang, there are many local religious figures disagreed with the discrimination and the crisis of compassion of elites and society toward Shiites. Despite they believe that Shiite is not the true Islam, they want to live together with coexistence. However, they were politically week and hence did not have a big influence. Those many Kyais are still silent because when declaring support or receiving, they were afraid of being attacked and marginalized by powerful conservative Kyais that could influence the viability of their pesantren unless they were supported by the government (Afdillah, 2016). On November-December 2012, Kontras Surabaya and the Sampang Police Chief had initiated a very positive reconciliation by not mentioning antagonism of Shiite-Sunni, but as brothers for the Sampang Shiites to be picked up from the temporary refugee camp in Sampang Sports Hall to their village. The last meeting was facilitated by the Kontras and Sampang Ministry of Religious Affairs by involving local kyai from around Karangpenang and survivors. In January 2013 political campaigns were on the rise and ultimately the reconciliation efforts were halted. In addition, Hamid, the reconciliation initiator of the Institute for Research and Development of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Sampang, was transferred to other areas, whereas his ambition was to make Sampang a peaceful pilot area for the Freedom of Religion and Belief case.

Although the right of Sampang Shiites as internally displaced people to return home is important, but everyday hardship that they must face is how Muslim Sampang Shiites survive to deal with their basic rights, like economic income, health, and education that are fulfilled by the government meagerly, because the relocation causes the big problem for Sampang Shiites as marginal
villagers that work previously as farmers. Working as a Coconut Peeler has finally become the choice of most refugees to meet the daily needs of families that have not been met only with government subsidies (Rp. 709,000/-/month/family). This work was initiated with officials of the Regional Disaster Management Agency [Baand Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah/BPBD] who accompanied them in the flat. Through this job, even until someone can repay the purchase of the motor. Sampang Shiites need to seek additional income to finance the education of children and other needs. Unfortunately, there is no role of government in providing jobs to replace their former jobs that are almost all farmers previously in their villages. On their own initiative, there are also Sampang Shiites who work as factory workers or cultivate fish and livestock in Puspa Agro's flat yard. There are also three to four young Sampang Shiites who sell satay.

According to Bayu, an officer of BPBD, the health service aspect for refugees is more severe. The Sampang Shiites who were sick were once hampered to receive treatment and care at General Hospital Soetomo, Surabaya. The hospital services are still blocked, even though BPBD officials explain their advisory duties on the Governor's instructions. Suddenly, BPBD officers broke the glass of the lock of the general hospital, because from morning until two o'clock in the night the patient of Sampang Shiite who was in emergency had not been handled yet. Then, the president director of the hospital dropped down. One of the BPBD officials said, "We are moving on the orders of the Governor. If the Governor's order is not responded to, on behalf of BPBD we close this hospital. From now, this hospital is under the control of BPBD." Finally, the Sampang Shiite patient we handled and the event became the main topic of the Regional Government meeting in the morning.

To deal with the slow handling of the Health Office in Sidoarjo, BPBD officers contacted the Muhammadiyah Central Board, which institutionally has large hospitals. Muhammadiyah Central Executive made a letter to the Muhammadiyah hospital in East Java to provide free health care, no matter how expensive. At that time the treatment was placed in Muhammadiyah Hospital Siti Khodijah, Gurah, Kediri, East Java. Certain cases were handled by the Muhammadiyah Lamongan Hospital which became the center of the Muhammadiyah hospital in East Java. In the government hospital, it is always questioned Public Health Insurance Card [Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat/ Jamkesmas], whereas the houses of Sampang Shiites have been burned by the masses along with all the documents they have.

BPBD also attempted at helping Sampang Shiite to gain political participation rights in the 2014 Indonesian presidential election. After coordinating with the Regional Election Commission [Komisi Pemilihan Umum/KPU], finally, Sampang Shiites could be included in the additional voter's list in Sidoarjo. However, the election was held outside the Puspa Agro flat, while the numbers of Sampang Shiites were very much. Finally, BPBD hired two 'rabbit trains' [kereta kelinci], which accidentally passed in front of the flat Puspa Agro Sidoarjo, to transport hundreds of Shiite Muslims Sampang follow the election.

In educational service, Sampang Shiite refugees and BPBD officers assess that the Education Office of the Sidoarjo government slowly fulfills the educational rights of Sampang Shiites' children. Teachers assigned by Sidorjo Education Office to teach in Puspa Agro flat have no seriousness. The activists of Center for Marginalized Communities, a local NGO in Surabaya, have a schedule of teaching the children each week to deal with the lack of seriousness. The activists of the Indonesian National Student Movement (GMNI) Surabaya also help as a teacher for mothers and elders that cannot speak Bahasa, for up to six months.
Sampang Shiites have never received a monthly subsidy of Rp. 709,000,- per month from January to March 2017. Sampang Regency Government stopped the quota in January 2017. This was previously delivered by Rudi, the chairman of National Unity and Politics Board [Baand Kesatuan Bangsa and Politik/ Bakesbangpol] in Sampang, during a consultation meeting with regional heads in Bojonegoro during the Human Rights Festival on dated 29 November 2016 and written in the report of the National Commission on Human Rights [Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia/Komnas HAM]. Unfortunately, the internally displaced people thought, as it once happened, the subsidy was delayed by the Sampang government, but the provision of the subsidy was stopped. Tajul Muluk, the Sampang Shiite leader, knew it when he read Komnas HAM's report in the Congress on Freedom of Religion and Belief held by Komnas HAM on 16 March 2017 in Jakarta. However, thanks to the meeting and the communication between Tajul Muluk and Asian Muslim Action Network activist (AMAN) Indonesia with the chairman of Bakesbangpol, the subsidy could be accepted by the refugees again.

Tajul Muluk was not actually invited to the gathering of stakeholders to listen to the victims of intolerance and discrimination from various regions, such as Ahmadiyah, Gafatar, indigenous religions, and others. Only elements of Bakesbangpol Sampang and Ahlul Bait Indonesia (ABI) are invited to represent Sampang Shiites. However, at the initiative of AMAN, ABI, and Kontras Surabaya, Tajul Muluk was sent to attend the event attended by Minister of Religious Affairs Lukman Hakim Syaefuddin, Indonesian Police Head Gen. Tito Karnavian, and Komnas HAM Chairman Imdadun Rahmat. When talking with Tajul Muluk on the sidelines of the event, Rudi said that he would attempt to make the subsidy back again. In addition to clarifying the clarity of subsidy, this forum also provides an opportunity for Tajul Muluk to affirm the persistence of internal refugees of Sampang Shiites to return home. This denied various information stating that the refugees are comfortable living in the Puspa Agro flat in Sidoarjo or willing to be relocated permanently elsewhere. Moreover, the condition of the flat building is increasingly worrying.

There was also a struggle for recognition and inclusion of Sampang Shiites that showed the disengagement of some brokers from civilians [beijingan] and constituencies that previously followed the domimative allegiance to persecute Sampag Shiites. This initiative also shows how personal networks that previously have been broken can be recovered and used to build grassroots reconciliation when the formal state institution and reconciliation group shows the inability to deal with the domimative clientelistic structure. On 23 September 2013 at around 16.00 WIB, in Puspa Agro flat, Sidoarjo, about 50 villagers of Blu’uren and Karang Gayam villages visited, apologized, and asked to reconcile with Shiites. This kind of grassroots reconciliation declared the "People's Peace Charter" between the ex-perpetrators of sectarian violence and Sampang Shiite refugees. They were tired of the conflict and committed to building peace and respecting their respective beliefs while upholding the culture and traditions. The initiative was from Sunni villagers who are aware that the Sunni-Shiite conflict in Sampang is due to the interests of the elite. The former perpetrators realized that the requirement of repentance proposed by the religious-social elite was not negotiable and the government was reluctant to act in affirmation of recognition. They finally initiate the reconciliation amidst the frustrating deadlock. In the post-reconciliation, the participants tried to convince the other residents in their hometown. There are also those who refuse, although relatively more citizens agree to reconciliation overall with the reintegration and repatriation of internally displaced Shiite Sampang. Even Mat Safi, a civilian (tojing), who was one of the principals who
led the attack on Shiite Sampang in 2012, was so keen to encourage this reintegration process.

However, the peace agency had found it difficult to expect follow-up from the government. According to Nur Tamam, the Chairman of Lembaga Persatuan Umat Islam (The Institute of Ummah Unity in Islam) Pamekasan and Kiyai of Al Hamidi Pamekasan Islamic Boarding School who participated to facilitate reconciliation, if only the government chose to support this sincere form, by helping to facilitate the movement, villagers are actually ready to flock to the towers to attend reconciliation and even to take refugees home. Unfortunately, the positively-constructed and participatory builds by civil society are delegitimized by elite forces. During and post-reconciliation there is a disturbance to the group departing. In addition, the intolerant group intercepted the signatories of the pact so as not to infiltrate the refugees and the mobilizers of the reconciliation were brought to the intolerant Kyai to cancel the signatures in the peace charter. Surya Dharma Ali, the Minister of Religious Affairs at the time, questioned the reconciliation because it was considered not to involve the local government and scholars by accusing the parties who use the conflict.

Conclusion

In the realm of the ruler (government) and brokers (Kiyais), the discourse was actually diverse, not uniform, not one in the suppression of Shiites. The difference shows that doing essentialism against the oppressor is not strategic. There are different discourses and even competition. The ability to see who the force can be engaged in and who can not is important in a movement. It needs knowledge of the power map, where the alliance force is, and which the other forces to be invited is to become a part of the alliance, even though it is part of the opponent. In this networking process, informal networks and mechanisms are crucial in the struggle for citizenship. Although the clientelistic structure is the big wall for repatriating Sampang Shiites, the grassroots reconciliation initiated by the former perpetrators is significant when the citizenship regime is unable to enhance recognition. There are also potential informal networks from a Sunni organization like Muhammadiyah. In addition, despite there are social and economic marginalization and the limited role of the government in fulfilling their basic rights in a refugee-like camp, the Sampang Shiites can still survive to meet their citizenship and keep hopes of returning home through informal networks and mechanisms.

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